

Korea: Com attack might begin with fabricated but plausible incident against Com forces.

Com objectives: a) To overrun South Korea, or b) to cause the UN/US to commit additional forces in South Korea in connection with pre-planned actions elsewhere in the free world.

For psychological advantage, Coms would probably not use atomic weapons, at least until used against them.

US should use atomics, if such use will bring aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on balance of political and military consideration, such use best advance US security interests. It is assumed that ~~MACV~~ PACOM would be authorized to use them.

If used, restrict them to ensure: accomplishment of mission; minimize destruction; localize conflict so far as possible; Communists have an opportunity to capitulate locally in Korea before the hostilities are unduly expanded.

Partial implementation of plan: if reinforcements not available; if nuclear weapons are not allowed. (Counterattack phase may be infeasible; withdrawal may be required).

- at w's 2.20
Coms/
KOR
= same
decision
unit
P4

Generalwar: armed conflict between forces of the USSR and the US, forces are overtly engaged.

In a general war, regardless of the manner of initiation, atomic weapons will be used from the outset. ((??))

((Any planning for general war--as defined--e.g., war in Europe against SU forces--without nuclear?))

((How much planning to ensure that there will be capabilities remaining for subsequent phase? Reserve forces; command, communications? How much thinking about war aims in subsequent phase, e.g., as dependent on remaining forces?

((How do you tell when a general war has started, unless it begins with massive SU atomic attack? It "may be the result of hostilities short of general war which were not intended initially to lead to general war? Could those be conducted against overt SU forces? Or does entry of SU forces signal start of general war?

Who decides when general war has started? Isn't it possible to be fighting ~~gen~~ SU troops without having launched atomic strike? If atomic weapons are to be used at outset: might this imply limited, tactical use; or does it mean all-out strike? (plan says "general war" would start with short initial phase...)

How much serious planning to determine feasibility of objectives during general war? to determine vulnerability, possibility of subsequent reconnaissance, control?

((What methods are planned to end war? To determine whether enemy wants to surrender? To follow up air attacks? What is planned to do if enemy atomic attack is very successful, or US very unsuccessful in initial phase? What do you do after alternative targets have been hit?

What is plan for succession of command in PACOM? Plan for command after CINCPAC is destroyed; or after Oahu is out of communication--in limited or general war?

How are evacuations, reinforcements going to be carried out in general war?

Relation of PACOM targets to SAC targets?

Has analysis been made of absolutely essential communications in general war? Alternate means of transmission? Plans for exploiting surviving communications for this traffic? Plans for assuring survival of comm. for this essential traffic?

What minimum structure of command and communications is essential to crucial general war functions?

Annex R continuity of operations

"Impossible to predict degree of destructiveness of attack" on CINCPAC headquarters! Since command posts are located in protected underground shelters such an attack might cause only minor damage! under the worst conditions, command facilities could be completely destroyed!

Primary factor in establishing alternate HQ is communications; secondary factor is vulnerability. Comwestsecron. (West Coast has advantages; component commanders should locate nearby). JCS will appoint successor if CINCPAC is killed; otherwise, next senior officer.

((This discussion seems totally inadequate.))



(8)

With 2 mile CEP and .5 MT warhead, Polaris will be used against primary governmental control centers and industrial base of SU and China. List of 156 target complexes in Russia (28 will not be targeted now) and 25 in China.

Maintain 55% of all Polaris subs submerged in patrol areas ready to fire. Early ones in Norwegian Sea. (alternate: Med). Later: WestPac.

Total sub force needed (55% on patrol) for unilateral destruction of target complexes: 75 in Western Russia—26; 118 in Western SU—36; 128 in Western and Eastern SU—40; 153 in Russia and China—47.

Control and coordination by unified commanders in the area, through their naval component commanders. (initially CINCLANT). (later CINCEUR, CINCPAC).

Advantages of Polaris:

1) Insures inevitable retaliation; 2) system is flexible—missiles can be launched promptly, or with deliberation; 3) compared to other systems, it will be immune to surprise attack, thus insuring ability to deliver weapons carried; 4) does not depend on vulnerable warning and defense systems for survival; 5) because of high survivability, possible to realistically establish long-range force and budgetary requirements; 6) system is independent of foreign control; 7) forces can easily be redeployed in response to national requirements; 8) blunting attacks against Polaris subs will not endanger US populations.

In Westpac: out of 26 on patrol, 2 against SU targets, 4 against ~~SINO~~ Chicom targets.

VLF stations: Maryland, T.H., Washington; one under lease in Japan; maintenance station at Haiku, T.H. and Balboa, Panama Canal Zone; one under construction at Washington County, Maine; one planned for Guam.

Limited or finite target system (possible because of SU concentration) which, if attacked, would destroy the Soviet will to continue the war.

10 USSR targets in Far East.

First SSBN will be supported from CONUS (Norway is closest patrol area); Norwegian Sea offers, initially, more reliable communications; navigational aids are equal to those in Med; politically, desirable to locate first tender in UK port rather than any other ally.

Second group should operate in Med.

Require 1/3 fatalities with 90% confidence; assume system reliability of 80%, attrition due to enemy countermeasures of 5%; total system degradation, hence, of 25%. Air burst.

National requirements: a) to deter Sino-Soviet authority from calculated resort to general war, by threat of reducing its industrial and governmental control base to a state of impotency; b) If general war is forced upon us, to reduce the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a condition which will permit the US to survive as a world leader and pursue its remaining objectives.

US will not rely overly on any single weapon system to meet requirements; this would simplify enemy's problems and he would know where to direct his counter-efforts.

SOP PACAF

lack of fuel, weather, navigation errors, etc., may prevent pilot from reaching primary target; or he may observe target to be destroyed. He will have an alternate target assigned, and be briefed to strike it instead.

Before hostilities, TOT's reported in hours and minutes from E-hour. After hostilities, TOT's submitted as DTG ZULU time.

TPOS reports submitted: by OI message as soon as operations permit, for targets with preplanned duplication; others, as operations dictate, normally not more frequently than hourly.

Strike plans submitted: normal with 7 variations:

-) primary day-good weather
-) primary night/AW
-) Normal day/good weather
-) normal night/AW
-) deployed primary day/good weather
-) deployed primary night/AW
-) deployed ~~xi~~ day/good weather
-) deployed night/AW

Normal and primary strike plans based on tactical warning; deployed strike plans based on strategic warning. After E-hour, strike plans no longer valid will be cancelled.

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- h) deployed night/AW

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1. atomic retaliatory capability, adequately safeguarded and ready for immediate action. (11)

2. adequate continental defense system.

3. highly mobile and suitably deployed ready forces, with the capability to respond selectively and flexibly to local aggression, using all weapons (including atomic weapons) as required, and to carry out general war tasks.

4. capability of maintaining control of essential sea areas and air communications.

5. A cold war contribution of US military power to reinforce and support, in appropriate ways, overt and covert political, economic, psychological, technological and cultural measures. *from JSCAP.*

Joint Strat. Capabilities Plan. - PAC section (4)

Basic national objective: to preserve and enhance the security of the US and its fundamental values and institutions.

1. superior, but margin diminishing; with present trends, will be lost. (margin in sense that retaliatory forces could inflict such loss and damage on enemy as to achieve a margin of advantage which, if exploited effectively in conjunction with other military operations, would permit US and its allies to prevail).

2. Improvements, but no relative gain because of SU offensive improvements. CONAD incapable of preventing an attack which could seriously damage the US.

3. Qualitative improvement in ready forces. Scope and timing of response to local aggression would be limited primarily by the degree to which maldeployment for initial tasks of general war could be accepted.

4. Can control essential air communications. But can't cope with SU threat to control of essential sea areas at the onset of a general war; ability ~~will~~ improve after offensive ASW operations, attacks at source, ~~the~~ coastal and shipping defense operations.

Objectives of Continental Defense: to be prepared at all times to counter an attack on the North American Continent in such a way as to deter Soviet attack, or, if ~~the~~ an attack occurs, to insure our survival as a free nation.

Thus, should protect and permit the launching of the nuclear retaliatory force.

Preparation should: 1) provide warning

2) counter enemy subversive and clandestine efforts

3) Prevent the threat of nuclear destruction from unduly restricting US freedom of action or weakening national morale.

4) Maintain adaptability to make timely changes as technology permits and as the nature of the threat changes.

5) Provide appropriate measures of protection for the civil population.

6) Include appropriately organizing, protecting, and placing in a condition of readiness the resources of the country essential to national survival.

Far East: as of June 30, 1958

IF US forces in FE were committed to defense of Taiwan or Southeast Asia, US capability to resist Communist aggression in either Japan or Korea would be considerably reduced.

Neither ROK or GRC forces could halt unaided a determined Chinese Communist invasion. Nor Japan and Ryukyus.

Chicomis will probably remain capable of overrunning all of Southeast Asia if opposed only by indigenous forces.

Unsatisfactory mine countermeasures capability.

Cold war activities: community and public relations; troop information and education programs; charitable programs; relief and rescue missions; demonstrations and maneuvers; military missions; training of foreign troops.

- (B)
- 1) Maintain the security of the Pacific Command and defend the US against attack through the Pacific Ocean.
 - 2) Hold along line...
 - 3) Retrain Japan and Okinawa as major bases of operation. ((?))
 - 4) Defend in Korea to the extent such action would not prejudice the primary task in the Far East of defending Japan and Okinawa, and provide logistic support for UN and ROK forces as practicable...
 - 5) Assist appropriate Allies in the defense of Taiwan, the Penghus, Indonesia, Malaya, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand.
 - 6) Philippines
 - 7) Defend Guam and the Hawaiian Islands.
 - 8) Provide US naval and air support as practicable to facilitate operations by Chinese Nationalist forces against Communist-held Asia.
 - 9) Provide US naval and air support as practicable to assist in the defense of Southeast Asia.
 - 10) Assist the British as practicable in the evacuation of Hong Kong.
 - 11) Protect sea communications in Alaskan waters and defend the Pacific approaches to the Panama Canal.
 - 12) Contain maximum Sino-Soviet Bloc forces, and neutralize enemy supporting bases in Communist-held Asia.
 - 13) If compelled by enemy pressure, and within the capabilities of forces and resources assigned, evacuate US and UN forces initially, and ROK forces thereafter as feasible, to areas outside of Korea.

Short of general war: be prepared to commit US forces, if necessary, to prevent Communist control of the Philippines; be prepared to blockade the China Coast ((No mention of India.))

Hit Sino - Soviet Bloc

from G-50P / CINCPAC

Concept of operations: Purpose of Annex is to provide Pacific Fleet Commanders with information required for formulation of supporting plans and for the exercise of command initiative in situations where recourse to higher authority may be physically impossible of execution or incompatible with the existing situation...A temporary partial or complete loss of communications capability is a possible consequence of the use of nuclear weapons. Loss of comm. could occur prior to the formal execution of the general emergency operations plans. To provide for the contingency wherein loss of command communications capability occurs, general emergency op. plans must be developed in adequate detail to be capable of implementation with minimum communications.

...All defensive tasks are to be executed in the event of a surprise attack or upon receipt of a tactical warning from a reliable source that indicates that an enemy attack has been launched, is under way, or has occurred. Prepare to accomplish all other tasks. ...It is not expected that an attack will completely deny for an extended period, the means for communicating the authority to initiate an all-out attack on the enemy. Therefore, Annex E will not be executed until specific authority for its implementation has been received.

Summary of JSCP objectives; including specifically deterrence of China.

Limited war may cause deployment bad for general war. Hence, intelligence needed to permit timely redeployment.

Emphasis on spectrum of actions, plans.

Enemy air delivery targets first priority; subs next.

Marines: 2 squadrons (40 AC) on Japan. List of CINCPAC atomic capable forces.

Atomic ops will be conducted and controlled by CINCPAC through the component commanders, except when operational control of atomic capable forces is passed to joint task force commanders or exercised under the direction of subordinate unified commanders.

In the early stages of general war, atomic coordination procedures may fail because of disrupted communications. The Fleet Commander who has access to atomic weapons sub-allocated to him will destroy targets as required by this Plan despite the lack of communications and subject to the receipt of authentic indication that the President has authorized the employment of atomic weapons.

JCS will exercise sufficient control of weapons expenditures to:

- 1) provide a ready accounting to the JCS for all atomic weapons allocated, including:
 - a) weapons remaining available.
 - b) weapons expended
 - c) purpose for which expended.
- 2) Minimize interference between atomic delivery forces.
- 3) Achieve maximum military effort in the delivery of atomic weapons.
- 4) Minimize overbombing, insure appropriate atomic targets are not overlooked and that ineffective action is not taken by one force through ignorance of the actions of another.
- 5) That appropriate forces having delivery capability and atomic weapons are promptly available to and in support of commanders as specified by the JCS.

To achieve a minimum response time would inevitably result in ~~loss of~~ denial of mobility and would require continuous operations in areas of high search and attack density. To insure that the PacFleet forces have the highest 'survival quotient' and probability of response to attack, the fleet must maximize its mobility and flexibility.

Weapons assigned but not suballocated may not be expended until authorized by CINCPACFLT; except when subordinate commanders are unable to communicate with him or higher authority or when comm. delays are unacceptable. Then, having received authority to expend weapons, commanders may use reserves as required.

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(36) (13)

only elements of one service. There were nine of these all together, as I remember. Everyone was clear on the ~~unified~~ fact that only the unified or specified commanders had the alleged authority. ^P This was a belief, in the Pacific, that clearly contradicted the principle that everyone seemed to believe in Washington, that only the President could launch or execute nuclear weapons, and that nothing had been delegated. No one could point to any basis for this in writing, and I came to believe that ^{it} probably this was a rumor, a myth, that such authorization had been given. If so, in its generality and impact it was like one that I had encountered when I was a platoon leader in the Marine Corps; there was a belief held by all enlisted men, but known to no officers, that a Bad Conduct Discharge could be reversed by evidence of good behavior after a year or two when one was out of the service, and that therefore a BCD had no real effect on one's later employment opportunities or anything else. This belief proved to be totally false, yet its existence, not known to the Officers, when I investigated it, meant that the deterrent effect of a threatened BCD was almost nullified.

^P In the case of this belief in the Pacific Command, I likewise found that the psychological effects of the belief were extremely widespread, because it was applied at each level of command by analogy to themselves. Since they were all "aware" that the unified commander had this alleged authorization from the President, they believed that in

CINCPAC reserve of JCS allocated weapons (not more than 20%; remainder sub-allocated to component commanders):

for use in operations short of general war; targets of opportunity; unconventional warfare

CINCPAC reserve weapons assigned to component commanders may not be used except by the direction of CINCPAC. In event of emergency, due to lack of time to communicate or loss of communications, component commanders may use the CINPAC reserve in accordance with policies in annex and plan.

((CHECK; is this means of controlling atomic ops short of general war? ~~can~~ Precisely when can component commanders use reserves? Are all CINPAC reserve weapons assigned to component commanders?))

Objective of CINCPAC UW plans is to exploit the chaotic conditions resulting from the atomic attacks. infiltration of indigenous special forces into areas which have been attacked with atomic bombs and disorganized; rally indigenous elements opposed to Communist regime before enemy security control could be re-established.

Also, profitable pin-point targets such as bridges, tunnels, power plants, difficult to attack by conventional means.

Only US personnel will employ man portable atomic demolitions

because of unpredictable extent of downwind fall-out, surface bursts programmed only when required for necessary damage to underground or other hard essential target, or when contamination effects essential (e.g., alternative undertakings).

JCS established worldwide constraint policy on fallout; high-yield surface burst attacks have been coordinated on a world-wide basis and will not be changed without CINCPAC authority. Lower yield surface bursts may be programmed subject to constraints; overriding military necessity.

To avoid alienation of potentially friendly populations in satellites and fringe areas (and allies), minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction; constraints on residual radiation from all drops, to limit expected dose.

Each target on CINCPAC target lists is assigned to one, sometimes two, component commanders; enemy atomic delivery targets assigned both to CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF. ((What about SAC?)) But try to reduce possibility that two actual attacks will be delivered.

Short of general war, UW use of Atomic Demolition Munitions allows precise placement and limits excessive destruction; tactical and psychological importance. Initial strikes against psychological-political forces may provide necessary show of intent and strength to dissuade the enemy from further aggression.

((Control? Possible SU use? SU threat? US threat as deterrent?))

Psychological-political targets: fixed military installation adjacent to large population centers; weapons carefully applied to destroy military targets; exploit psych advantage of swift and effective use of atomic weapons

Authority to expend atomic weapons is granted by presidential declaration. CINCPAC and/or component commanders may received this authority:

- 1) CINCPAC may receive direct from JCS
- 2) CINCPAC may received direct from CNO as member of JCS
- 3) Component commanders may receive from CINCPAC
- 4) Component commanders may receive from Chiefs of their service as members of JCS. Notification of component commanders by Service Chiefs is back up procedure to CINCPAC notification.
- 5) Notification by any authenticated source listed above is authority to expend those sub-allocated weapons in accordance with the applicable plan

Atomic ops are conducted and controlled by CINCPAC through component commanders

presidential
authority via
JCS.
CNO.
CINCPAC
Service chiefs.

4001
Kinds of war the US should plan for, in order of probability of occurrence:

- 1) Cold war.
- 2) Military conflict short of general war.
 - a) War of limited objectives with or without the use of atomic weapons.
 - b) ~~Military conflict~~ War initially of limited objectives but with high potential for uncontrolled expansion, with or without the use of atomic weapons.
3. General war.
 - a) General war resulting from hostilities short of general war which were not initially intended to lead to general war.
 - b) General war preceded by a period of strategic warning, or general war initiated by a Soviet surprise attack.

Although military operations short of general war are not intended to provoke general war, military or political conditions might be created which would precipitate the initiation of general war by the USSR. Further, the US, under expanding military operations, might achieve a significant degree of mobilization. Therefore, the deliberate initiation of general war by the USSR under these conditions is considered to be unlikely. It would obviously be more advantageous to the USSR to initiate general war by a surprise atomic attack on the US.

((To make this consistent with 3 above--though it may not really be consistent--3a must be split into "general war started by US" and "general war started by SU", with the latter less likely than 3b.

Anyway, this estimate is based only on one aspect of the situation; in other ways, SU might be in better position to launch general war; anyway, pressures to do so might override.))

17. In the event of general war, a war in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the US are overtly engaged, the basic military objective of the US Armed Forces is the defeat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a degree which will assure the accomplishment of the US national objectives in order to preserve the security of the US and its fundamental values and institutions.

Mobilization Base: Pre D-day planning for mobilization will improve our capabilities to conduct general war which might result from hostilities short of general war. Also provide for peripheral wars.

((NOTE: not intended to improve capabilities in general war resulting from SU surprise attack.))

e. Provide pre-D-day stocks of selected supplies and equipment outside the US reasonably protected to insure that those forces surviving the enemy atom c attack will have a reasonable capability of performing assigned initial tasks effectively despite substantial interruption of resupply from the US during the initial phase of war.

...Mobilization, under the conditions of cold war or military conflict short of general war...

Basic undertakings: general war:

a. General:

- 1) Destruction or neutralization of the Soviet capability for delivery of atomic weapons.
- 2) The defeat of the Soviet Bloc military forces.
- 3) The destruction or neutralization of the Soviet Bloc war-making capability.
- 4) Control of essential portions of the land, sea and air.
- 5) Protection and utilization of the strategic locations in the northern hemisphere as bases for the launching of operations against the USSR and as bases for the defense of the US.
6. Mobilization of reserve forces...

e. Far East-Southeast Asia:

- 1) Retention of Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines, and Malaya up to the K...

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e. Far East-Southeast Asia:

- 1) Retention of Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines, and Malaya up to the Kra Isthmus for the utilization of their strategic locations, forces, facilities and resources in the allied war effort.
- 2) The containment or defeat of maximum USSR and other Sino-Soviet Bloc forces in Asia and the neutralization of their supporting bases and facilities.
- 3) If necessary the military of Communist China to a degree which will permit the accomplishment of our national objectives.

When atomic weapons are used in operations short of general war, it is anticipated that CINCPAC will direct and closely control each atomic strike in the initial stages. If appropriate, CINCPAC subsequently may decentralize control of atomic strikes, subject to specific restrictions.

((HOW WILL HE CONTROL?))

PACOM Operations Liaison Office (POLO).

ATPOS (post strike reports) submitted hourly; except targets with pre-planned duplications, submitted by EMERGENCY message.

Anti-sub, air defense, close support atomic operations submitted every 12 hrs.

((How does DEFCON affect strike plans?)) 3 strike plans: Day-good weather; night-bad weather; alternative undertakings.

ATION: atomic situation message; initiated by CINCPAC to inform strike force commanders of case of interference or duplication, and directing action.

Standards: Flash--5 minutes; Emergency-20 minutes; Operational Immediate--30 min.

Broadcast procedure for atomic coordination: 3 minutes before drop, at drop: UHF.

JCS allocate weapons to CINCPAC for use in general war; CINCPAC assigns them to component commanders for physical custody, maintenance, security and readiness; CINCPAC sub-allocates a portion of these assigned weapons to component commanders for use in general war (commander needs only an authenticated "use" message to expend these weapons). Difference between weapons assigned and weapons sub-allocated constitutes CINCPAC's reserve--can't be used without authority from CINCPAC.

Approving authority: commander authorized to approve the expenditure of specified atomic weapons.

Goals of SOP: to increase effectiveness of PACOM forces through coordinated atomic strike plans (pre-strike planning and coordination); minimize interference; minimize reliance on communications immediately prior to and during atomic operations; provide info for command decision.

- 3) Bringing military conflict to a rapid and successful conclusion.
- 4) Accomplishing successfully general war. ((NOTYPE II))

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penalties inherent to misdirected atomic operations: intelligence related
to such ops must receive priority

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control of these atomic attacks &
announcing specific restrictions
spb-allocations.

Exercise general control by
and by careful control of

20
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Notes on SACEUR control of Nuclear Weapons

McGeorge Bundy announced that a meeting of the National Security Council staff that I had been appointed as a one-man committee representing the NSC and the Department of Defense to investigate presidential control of nuclear weapons. In this capacity I had access to the various war rooms, documents and personnel involved in presidential control, and I began by interviewing at length Commander ~~Sk~~ Tazewell Shepherd, the president's military attache in charge of the ^{current} procedures and ~~x~~ "execute codes" by which the President would signal- command nuclear operations. I told Shepherd the attitudes that I had found in the Pacific and he seemed genuinely convinced that they were incorrect. He said that he had not knowledge whatsoever of any authorization having been given to any of the unified or specified commanders for executing their war plans in the absence of an explicit presidential directive, and he felt sure that ^{if} such an authorization existed he would have known about it. ^PHe also undertook to ask others working in the presidential command post in the White House about this, and arranged for me to visit the underground ^{new command post} command post at Camp David in Gettysburg, Virginia to talk with the personnel there. I also visited the underground command post, named as I recall, Highpoint, under a mountain some distance from Washington which was meant to house the civilian leaders of the government during a nuclear emergency. In none of these places did anyone claim any awareness knowledge of such an authorization nor did they even appear to be aware of the assumption that existed in the Pacific that such an authorization existed. After a number of such

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interviews, and after Shepherd reported back to me that his further investigation had failed to disclose any evidence of authorization, I concluded tentatively that the belief in the Pacific was based upon a myth, one that it was clearly important to dispel. ^P Of course, one could not be definitive about such a negative finding; it was a matter of my judgement that ~~Bluf~~ ^{that it was} was not deceiving me and was unlikely that such an authorization could have been passed to the commanders, even in the Eisenhower period before Shepherd's arrival, without Shepherd being able to find any hint of it. I reported this to Carl Kaysen, who by this time was McGeorge Bundy's deputy for national security Affairs, with the recommendation that directives be issued to the various commands and particularly the Pacific command laying to rest the dangerous beliefs which were encouraging "nuclear initiatives" at all levels of the command.

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As I remember this report coincided with my leaving Washington and returning to RAND for a month or two. When I returned in June or July of 1961 I dropped in on Kaysen to check the progress of several projects and he remarked to me, "By the way, I finally found the black notebook you were looking for." I don't recall ever having heard the expression "black notebook" before this remark, and at this point I can't recall for sure whether he simply described it to me or whether, as I vaguely recall, he actually showed it to me. In any case, Kaysen informed me of the existence of a loose-leaf notebook containing copies of letters which had been sent to all the unified and specified commanders from SAC, to SACEUR, CINCPAC and the others, essentially specifying the conditions under which they could proceed to use their own judgement about executing their war plans. These conditions ~~included~~ inability to communicate with Washington, or situations of extreme time urgency. All this, of course, contradicted what I had concluded, based on the investigation I had done and everything that had been told to me in the Washington area. I asked him how this had turned up. Kaysen told me that after his discussion with me a month or two earlier, he had still felt uneasy about my conclusion, in the light of my initial report about the understanding in the field. He had continued to probe at the Joint Chiefs and elsewhere, and in some way that he did not describe to me, McGeorge Bundy had finally managed to unearth an actual physical notebook in which they learned - six months or more into the life of the new administration - the existence

of written authorization to the current unified and specified commanders, signed by President Eisenhower. Not only had the Kennedy Administration remained ignorant of these understandings for six months but they had been led to believe by the officers directly involved in nuclear control that such authorizations did not exist. (This was, incidentally, the summer of the Berlin Crisis in Europe, climaxed by the building of the Berlin Wall in August, a summer in which the possibility of general nuclear war was so much in the minds of officials that Kennedy took the politically costly step of urging on the public a large-scale fallout shelter program). To put it another way, low levels of nuclear command in the Pacific proved to have been better informed about the control structure than was the President of the United States or his immediate civilian and military advisors.

(It would have been straight-forward, of course, when I raised this question with the White House staff, to have queried the various unified and specified commanders directly as to whether they had or believed they had such authorization. As I remember, my understanding at the time ^{as to} of why this was not done - and why instead I was asked to investigate the matter discretely in Washington - was ^{that} reluctance on the part of the White House staff, ^{was a result of} to admit ignorance of such a fundamental question or an inability to resolve it quickly in Washington. Moreover, they would not have wanted to raise the matter, as an issue in the relations between the White House and the commanders, without having made a decision as to how to deal with the situation.)

I asked Kaysen what the President had done since the discovery of these authorizations. "He renewed them; he signed new authorizations." Kaysen said. Needless to say, I was both ^{surprised} amazed and dismayed by this news. Kaysen explained that the President did not feel it was an opportune time to appear to reverse the judgement of such a military matter of his predecessor, General Eisenhower. (This was soon after the Bay of Pigs and the confrontation with Krushchev at Vienna, ^{of which had shaken toward military confidence - Kennedy's toughness} Indeed, Eisenhower having made a formal judgement on the matter, it would have seemed a striking gesture of lack of faith in his commanders if Kennedy had chosen to take back the authorization, even though the physical communication problem with subordinate commanders was significantly worse in the Eisenhower period than it was to become in the early 1960s, with the introduction of new cables, new military channels - including ultimately the hot line with the Soviet Union - and especially with the advent of satellite communications in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.

Thus, the upshot of this investigation was disappointingly similar to that of my report on the nuclear weapons storage in Iwakuni in Japan, where MacNamara ended by allowing the vessel containing nuclear weapons to return from Okinawa to its base on the beach in Japan rather than ^{to} engage in a major controversy with the Navy on this issue.

There was a significant sequel to this episode three years later. Senator Goldwater made a major proposal in his 1964 campaign that in the light of communications problems American commanders overseas should be given the authority by

the President to use nuclear weapons at their own initiative. He made this part of a general charge that the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations were hampering the ability of theater commanders to use nuclear weapons by instituting the "permissive action link" (the physical lock on nuclear weapons proposed by a number of us in 1961) and by delaying deliveries of nuclear weapons overseas.

As a general in the Air Force Reserve, with intimate contacts at the highest levels in the Air Force, Goldwater almost certainly knew that such authorization had already been given by Eisenhower, renewed by Kennedy and, as I learned in 1964, had been renewed by Lyndon Johnson after the death of John Kennedy.

Throughout the campaign in 1964 it was obvious that Goldwater was getting large amounts of information, including Top Secret classified information, from the Air Staff. A group was working in the outer office in Secretary McNamara's suite of offices in the Pentagon - a large room then known to insiders as the "TFX Room" because of staff work done there in connection with the TFX hearings in Washington and which later housed the staff of the Pentagon Papers study in 1967 and 1968 - on "truth squad" operation, under Adam Yarmolinsky, to answer the various detailed factual charges raised by Goldwater. *(I wrote several analyses of Goldwater speeches in this operation)* A few years ago Karl Hess, now a consultant with the Institute for Policy Studies but, then the major speech writer for Senator Goldwater, informed me that in the summer of '64 General LeMay himself would meet with Senator Goldwater in such unobtrusive places as shopping center parking lots, where

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LeMay would transfer large batches of Top Secret staff reports from his car or from under his rain coat to Senator Goldwater personally for his use in the campaign. LeMay, of course, was not only Chief of Staff of the Air Force but had been for many years commander of SAC and as such, had been aware of the authorization. In fact, LeMay had alluded to it in a discussion with Carl Kaysen and myself during the Partridge Study Group on Presidential Command and Control in late 1961. Likewise, his successor, General Power, alluded to it when I interviewed him for the Kennedy Oral History Project in 1964.

Thus Goldwater, in making the proposal, was well aware that it had already been secretly in effect during three administrations. On the other hand, President Johnson proceeded to denounce the proposal - which he had secretly implemented - as being both irresponsible and an abnegation of his responsibilities under the law to be the sole authority for the expenditure of nuclear weapons. Indeed this proposal of Goldwater's - along with comments that he made about the possible use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia - was made into the most effective campaign ammunition against Goldwater, with the issue of "nuclear responsibility" taking considerable precedence in the public mind over the issue of involvement in Vietnam.

A controversial but powerful television commercial showed a young girl plucking petals from a daisy while a voice in the background counted down, ten, nine, eight..., the commercial ending with a nuclear explosion. Obviously, the Democrats gave

no hint either that Johnson had already implemented the proposal made by Goldwater, nor that the White House was fully aware that Goldwater himself was aware of this. The analogy is very close to the other issue of institution large scale bombing against North Vietnam. Again, LBJ was denouncing as irresponsible and virtually crazy, a proposal by his opponent which - as his Air Force opponent knew - had already that year been fully staffed-out within his own administration and which all of his major advisors believed should and would be implemented no later than the beginning of the next year. (In fact, the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against North Vietnam did begin in February, 1965, against a target list prepared in early 1964).

In these matters of nuclear authorization and bombing of North Vietnam (though not on the issue of nuclear bombing of Indochina, the American public was being invited to choose in a presidential election between two candidates who apparently differed sharply on two major issues of policy, while information held secret in the Executive Branch showed that the two candidates were, in fact, completely in agreement on each of these issues. What is more, both of them knew this to be the case, and both of them also withheld this further knowledge from the public. When the Pentagon Papers revealed in 1971 the Johnson Administration's prior planning to carry out, if the "Goldwater Plan" for bombing North Vietnam, Senator Goldwater announced that he had, indeed, known this during the campaign, but had refrained from enlightening the public, because, he said,

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"Who would have believed me?" As for sharing documents with the public, these were, of course, classified; and it must be remembered that Senator Goldwater strongly favored the carrying out of these secret plans, though the American public did not - as indicated by the landslide vote against Goldwater - which was, basically, why the plans were secret and classified. They were no secret at all from the North Vietnamese, who were warned - in threats from the U.S. public - of the imminence of bombing if they did not meet U.S. terms, in June and August, 1964.

This situation was strikingly similar to that in 1960, where a major issue was supposedly a disagreement on the use of Cuban refugees to invade and over-throw the government of Castro in Cuba. John F. Kennedy, charging the Administration with dereliction, proposed a use of these refugees which, it appears, he had been made aware both formally and informally was already an Administration project. The incumbent, Vice President Richard Nixon, informs us in his account in My Six Crises that he felt he had no choice but to protect the secrecy of the operation (from the American public - obviously not from Castro, who was well informed on the plans) by denouncing it as a policy that would be not only unwise but which would contradict all of our legal obligations and formal undertakings through the United Nations and the Organization of American States. This characterization of the plan begun under Eisenhower - for which, according to Howard Hunt, Richard Nixon was "the White House Action Officer" - and carried out by John F. Kennedy, was quite correct.

Another episode--SACEUR control of nuclear weapons.
As I described in connection with my visit to the Kunsan
alert base in Korea, the people involved in the entire

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nuclear delivery system were aware of the central problem of reliability, by 1960 and 1961, which had to do with communications and with the vulnerability of command posts and commanders. The prime principle in the control of nuclear weapons, one that was written into the Atomic Energy Act itself, was that the use of nuclear weapons had to be controlled and authorized by the President personally. All written plans expressed that principle. The military, however, were very conscious that this posed the possibility that the President and virtually all of his legal successors could be destroyed by a single nuclear weapon on Washington, so that the system would be deprived of its control authority; if the strict letter of the law were followed, the entire system would be paralyzed. Even in a physical sense, the destruction of a number of communications terminals such as the central command facilities both in Washington and in SAC Headquarters in Omaha and a handful of others in the country, would make it close to impossible to get the word out to all world-wide nuclear forces, or even to forces within the country, either for an alert or to execute the general war plans. It gradually came to be recognized that this was a separate and almost more urgent problem than the vulnerability of the bases themselves.

In the '50's Rand, through the work of Albert Wohlstetter, Fred Hoffman, and Andrew Marshall, in their reports R-266 and R-290, which are now unclassified, the

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Air Force and the President had become aware of the vulnerability of the bases and the vehicles themselves, since the bombers were clustered on a relatively small number of bases which were highly vulnerable. This was a major concern of the Gaither Report in 1957, which was in large part based on briefings by analysts from Rand. It was not until 1959 and 1960, as that problem came under control in part with the onset of Polaris forces and Minuteman, that it became realized that even if the vehicles survived worldwide, the system could be paralyzed by attacks on the communications centers and the commanders, which were small in number and also vulnerable. In principle, being smaller in number, these could be made less vulnerable, made hardened or mobile in various ways. But on the other hand, it was very difficult to harden a small number of points against a determined attack. This was the problem on which I specialized--the reliability, in various senses, of the command process. I picked this problem partly because it had just been recognized as urgent about the time I came to Rand, and partly because I was drawn to it intellectually from my long interest in the decision-making process under uncertainty.

In fact, I was asked to Rand partly because of my work in decision theory. When I arrived I read the then Top Secret Report R-290, mainly by Albert Wohlstetter. At one point in that report, which was written in 1956,

there is an analysis of the following problem. The vulnerability of the retaliatory bomber force depended on how quickly it took to the air after an alert. But that in turn depended on how quickly an order to take off was given after the initial signals had appeared. This was a period that had to be measured in minutes, since if ballistic missiles were on their way the earliest possible warning would be 15 to 20 minutes. The question became, How soon after the earliest radar warning would an order go out to the planes, and then, once having gotten the order, how quickly could the force get into the air?

Wohlstetter pointed out that the planning and the calculations of this problem were based on the assumption that either the situation was peace-time, in which case there were no signals, or else that the president was told that there was an attack underway, in which case one could ask, physically, how fast would he react to that information? But Wohlstetter pointed out that in the early minutes of an actual attack, by far the most likely situation was that he would not know for certain whether he was under attack or not, since the signals would be partial and equivocal; you really had to look at his decision time in terms of that uncertainty situation.

Well, this sort of hypothetical problem was immediately fascinating to me, because it was essentially the subject of my honors thesis at Harvard and later, in

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more general form, the subject of my Ph.D. thesis. In fact, the very summer before, in 1957, at Stanford, I had been on a Social Science Research Council grant in a group studying decision making under uncertainty, at the end of that summer (just a month before the Soviet ICBM test, and the Gaither Report). So my immediate reaction in the summer of 1958 was that I had found an area where practical problems of the greatest importance are being formulated in terms that lend themselves immediately to the abstract analysis that I have specialized in. Since that abstract analysis had to do with individual decision-making under uncertainty, it lent itself directly to problems that focused on decision-making by an individual such as the President. In those days, many abstract analyses personified an entire nation or strategic system such as Russia or the U.S. as a single "player" or strategist; that type of analysis was obviously at best an extreme simplification, an abstract aid to thought. But I was particularly drawn to practical problems where one realistically was concerned with decisions by a single individual; the decisions by the President of the United States in his control of nuclear weapons, which by law were given exclusively to one individual, were a perfect area for me. I had been thinking about such problems for a number of years. So I gradually made myself very expert in the concrete circumstances of these Presidential problems. But that in turn required me to be dealing

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with what were regarded as the highest and most sensitive secrets. First, they were within the nuclear strategic area; second, they concerned the ~~concerned~~ nuclear war planning; third, they concerned control in actual nuclear war; and fourth, control by the President at the highest level. So, by every step, I was led to what we thought of as our most sensitive command and control information.

Now, in the course of my work in the Pacific, I was concerned not only with the assurance that we would launch our weapons, but with the risk that we would launch them on some occasion inappropriately, by a false alarm or unauthorized action, and bring about a war in that fashion. I became aware of a widespread attitude that there did, in fact, exist an agreement between the President and ^{and} unified commanders that in the event of communications failure - which was fairly likely, it happened all the time in those days and perhaps still does - that a unified commander did have the right to launch or even "execute" his vehicles if he had reason to believe that a nuclear attack was eminent. The Reorganization Act of 1958 specifies a number of "unified or specified commanders." "Unified commander" means a theater-type commander controlling a number of elements from different services, such as CINCPAC in the Pacific, CINCAL in Alaska, CINCEUR in Europe (who is also SACEUR for NATO forces, i.e., Supreme Allied Commander in Europe). SAC is the only "specified" command, a command at that level which has

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logical terms it should also apply to them, if they were out of touch with their next higher level of command. This was discussed quite frankly by a number of people at different levels in the following terms: "Yes, of course, it's against the book, but..... if this were the situation...."

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{It was close to inevitable -- indeed, almost necessary in terms of logic and practicality - that the notion that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific might have authorization to proceed to implement war plans on his own judgement under some circumstances would communicate itself in the same terms to lower commanders. After all, it was just as likely that CINCPAC in mid-Pacific in Hawaii would be out of communication with his subordinate commanders in what was known as WESTPAC (Western Pacific) as it was that the continental United States would be out of communication with Hawaii; therefore, if indeed such an authorization existed for CINCPAC, as the commanders under CINCPAC seemed to believe, two things would be almost necessary to make it effective: a) that an execute order from the President should go not only to Hawaii but should go simultaneously to subordinate commands, lest it be short-circuited by the destruction of Hawaii itself; b) if CINCPAC believed it to be the desire of the President that under circumstances of crises - that is, in the expectation that general war might be imminent - and failure of communications, he should be free to exercise his own judgement, it would almost surely seem to him and to his subordinates that the same should apply to his own immediate subordinate commanders; if they should receive information of an execute order from Washington directly, ~~on which the decision of whether to~~ but fail to receive a direct order from CINCPAC, while experiencing a communications break with CINCPAC (which might have been destroyed by nuclear attack). By the same token CINCPAC would presumably suppose that his immediate

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subordinates should, in the national interest, exercise judgement in case they were out of communication with both CINCPAC and Washington, thus finding themselves in the same situation for which he presumed he had been given authority to execute his war plans. In other words, CINCPAC would logically infer that he could not reliably carry out the intention of the President with respect to the actions of his theater nuclear capabilities unless he provided explicitly for the possibility that he himself would be attacked - and provided in the same way as Washington had provided for the possibility that the command posts in Washington or communications in the U.S. had been disrupted - namely, by allowing lower commanders to exercise their own judgement.

I had occasion to test the ^{inference} at a number of levels of command in the Pacific, from highest to lowest.

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For example, On January 26, 1960, I discussed command problems for two hours on board the St. Paul, Command Ship of the Seventh Fleet, with Vice Admiral Kivette, a commander of the Seventh Fleet, and Vice Admiral Eckstrom, Commander of Naval Air in the Pacific. Both of them expressed the attitude particularly strong in the Navy, that actual combat operations must be left to the relative autonomy of the engaged units with minimum expectation of or attempt to control by higher command. Even in limited war, Kivette said, it wouldn't matter if communications were out between Oahu and the Seventh Fleet, or even between the Seventh Fleet and the carrier task groups: "Operations would be decentralized, I wouldn't be interfering...unless I had some intelligence they didn't have." Kivette saw a limited war as being centralized only so long as political maneuvering was dominant, with x no shooting (as in the Lebanon, Taiwan and Laos crises). "As soon as shooting started" the two admirals expected, and approved, extreme decentralization. In short, although they expected communications frequently to be disrupted, especially in war time but even for natural causes, they were relaxed about the implications of this. They both rejected notions that preplanning could solve problems; one couldn't plan for everything, surprises must be expected. But at the same time, they did not foresee or desire post-hostilities planning or centralized direction, preferring to rely on the judgement of the carrier task group commanders, simply providing him with objectives. They agreed it would be "nice to know" what Air Force bases had been hit at the outset of a nuclear war or what

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carriers had been destroyed but under the conditions of the GEOP, "it probably wouldn't matter anyway."

What if their own communications with Oahu went out, I asked, and they thought, for other reasons, that nuclear war had commenced? Admiral Kivette paused meaningfully, then said to me: "I stand mute."

After a further pause he added "Anyway, I just can't believe that we could be cut off from all communications; we could get through to someone and he would know what was happening." Admiral Eckstrom added to this: " It would depend on the whole picture; what had been happening up to that moment, how ready are we, are we fueled up, etc." (my italics).

As in ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ the case of other subordinate commands, ^{on the same ship} Seventh Fleet war planners at lower-levels were more explicit ^{conveying} in/their understanding of the situation; it was their belief that Admiral Kivette carried explicit instructions to exercise initiative in case of communications outage during crisis conditions.

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So I came back to Washington with the feeling that if the belief were untrue, it was of the highest urgency to counteract that belief. And if it were true, on the other hand, then special methods were essential to counteract the effects of it at lower levels. In fact, I was prepared to say that they should consider changing the authorization, if it existed, if for no other reason than to change the imitation of it at lower levels, because that widespread belief seemed absolutely fatal. It communicated itself down to every pilot in the world. This was one of the things, by the way, that made me feel the great urgency of getting a physical lock onto all of these weapons.

This was one of the things that I briefed to McGeorge Bundy, finally, in that long briefing in February 1961. The result of that was that Bundy and Harry Rowen agreed that this was of great importance to investigate. Bundy at that time did not know and was not able to find out whether there was such an agreement. He could see nothing in the files that indicated what I described, but

since it is the practice of departing Presidents to take most of their files with them, that look was not conclusive.

(Parenthetically, there let me mention something I observed when I happened to be in Washington on a trip in December of 1962, just after the Cuban missile crisis, while Kennedy was with MacMillan in Nassau discussing the termination of the Skybolt contract. Skybolt was an air-launched missile that we had agreed to furnish the British for use by their bombers; Kennedy had just decided not to complete development of it. I dropped in on Adam Yarmolinsky in McNamara's office and found him doing a lot of telephone calls. He had been called the night before from Nassau by Kennedy for a copy of the Skybolt Agreement which had been made between Eisenhower and MacMillan. MacMillan was claiming that our cancellation of Skybolt was a direct contradiction of assurances by Eisenhower that if we were to drop the contract we would provide money to the British for them to continue their own Skybolt research. This was not Kennedy's belief so he wanted to see the exact copy of the agreement. It was discovered that only an aide-memoir had been done on the basis of Eisenhower's conversation with MacMillan, which had taken place with the two of them alone. No one else had been present during that conversation, but a subsequent memo had been written. No copy of it could be found. The staff searched the White House files and they searched the DoD

files and the OST files and no one could find a copy of any such agreement between the two heads of state. Finally it was concluded that Eisenhower had taken it with him to the Eisenhower Library, but the person who had called John Eisenhower, who was then in charge of the Eisenhower Library, was on bad terms with him, and Eisenhower had curtly refused to go to the trouble of searching the file at that moment to discover the Agreement while Kennedy was discussing the matter with McMillan. So Yarmolinsky was phoning around urgently, trying to get over this little human blockage so that we could get a copy, which they finally did get from the Eisenhower Library.)

At an NSC meeting, McGeorge Bundy announced a Joint White House/DoD Committee of one - namely, Daniel Ellsberg - was being formed to investigate the problem of presidential authorization of the use of nuclear weapons. I then was authorized

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In the fall of 1959 CINCPAC (the Commander-in-
Chief of the Pacific), who was at that time Adm. Harry Felt,
called for a study of the command and control process of
nuclear forces in the Pacific to be done in Hawaii, under his
command. The Office of Naval Research organized the study
under Dr. John Wilkes who threw together researchers from a
number of non-profit research corporations working for the
Defense Department and I was asked to join this from the Rand Corporation.

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Rand Corporation.

I had just joined Rand permanently in July of 1959, having spent the summer of '58 there as a consultant. In the summer of '59 I chose as a focus of my research the command-control process for nuclear forces. This was a question which was coming to seem of increasing importance as people studied the process of the alerting of nuclear forces in the event of an oncoming nuclear attack and the implementation of an execute order by the President.

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~~me go right to the fact that~~ in the fall of '59, I moved
to Camp Smith, ^{CINCPAC Headquarters in Hawaii.} I did not agree to stay for the whole year
since my wife was not willing to accompany me but I did go
for several months at first and then went back repeatedly
during 1960 to help them in later stages of their report.
The basic problem we were to look at was how to assure the
reliability of an "execute" message getting out to the
various forces in the Pacific if a decision were ever made
to use nuclear ^{weapons.} force. But there were many related questions.
We had communications experts with us, of course, who were
looking in particular at redundancy and reliability and speed
in the communications system. Another problem that I was
interested in was the unauthorized action problem: how to
assure that no subordinate would be able to launch the
forces under his command in the absence of an authorization
from the President or from his superiors. A third problem
was how to assure the survival of authority at various
positions of command so that the whole command structure
could not be put out of action by a coordinated surprise
nuclear attack. (To this end, for example, a command post
in Hawaii was located in an underground command center.
It had been originally an ammunition storage depot, built
under a pineapple field in Hawaii during the Second World
War.)

In the end, in pursuit of this problem, I was in almost
every command post and in particular every underground
command post in the Pacific and in the U.S.

command post in the U.S. and in the Pacific, of which there are quite a few. For example the command post in Japan itself was in what has formerly been the Japanese Imperial Command Post, which was in the outskirts of a suburb of Tokyo. But all of these underground command posts had been built essentially against conventional bombs and as a result very little attention had been given, in particular, to blast doors. ^PThe blast of a nuclear explosion would be so great that if it were anywhere in the vicinity of one of these undergrounds it would blow through any ordinary security door and kill everyone inside. In other words, it is not enough that you have protection from a direct hit over your heads from a small bomb or even from a very large bomb, but every aperture letting in ventilation, letting out communication, and allowing for doors, had to be equally secure against blast pressure or the thing was entirely worthless. These doors, were a very important practical problem, not entirely easy to solve. ^e ^{solved} ^PEven when you did that, if you were to operate from there you had to assure that you would be able to communicate out even after explosions; and a relatively late problem we discovered in the course of testing was that the blast, by shaking up all the electronic equipment inside could easily destroy the functioning of all of your radios, transmitters, etc. even though it did not kill anyone. So we had ^{many} all these problems with decreasing the vulnerability of both the communications and the commanders themselves.

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Remember that from very early on, indeed, by the time of the Atomic Energy Act by Congress, the President alone, ^{in principle,} controlled the use of all nuclear weapons and authorized the use of nuclear weapons. This is one tactical military decision which is, ^{by} statute and by certain Presidential directives, reflected in the written war plans, limited to the authority of the President alone. The same applies to a few other weapons like bacteriological weapons or gas, in terms of plans.

Meanwhile, it was generally recognized within the Air Force that there was a severe problem of communications and of survival of command. In their extreme focus on being able to carry out their mission of exploding nuclear weapons over Russian targets, when appropriate, a great many other problems, such as not exploding them when not appropriate, were deemphasized; particularly in the light of the fact that there was a high likelihood, much greater than presidents were likely to realize, that communications could be disrupted.

You had, in other words, a command structure which presumed that only a president could ^{call} allow for the firing of nuclear weapons. At the same time you had an awareness by most of the military people down the chain that the president himself could easily be killed by a bomb on Washington, and in fact most intervening levels of command could easily be wiped out by only a few more bombs. They lived with what was for them a nightmare: that in the event of actual attack there was no likelihood that an authorized command would reach the actual operating level of the nuclear delivery forces. ^{As a result} In effect there was great resistance on their part to the very idea of procedures that would make it physically impossible for those lower levels to take action on their own in the event of an actual war. At the same time, of course, they knew that they had always to give lip service to the assumption that only the President could "release these weapons." The effect of this was that

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they chose not to look closely at the system that really resulted, which left enormous leeway, in fact almost untrammelled opportunity, for individuals to carry out unauthorized action.

I had become possibly the most knowledgeable person in the country on the processes of this control system by the time that the ^{books} books Fail-safe, Seven Days in May and Dr. Strangelove appeared. Strangelove is actually based on a book called Red Alert and Fail-safe was by William Burdick. What I had discovered was that the problem in Burdick's "Fail Safe" - was a mechanical, electronic failure by a computer transmitting an improper direction - was actually very unlikely inasmuch as there were many levels of human intervention at various points and the system was not set up mechanically to transmit things like that. But then on the other hand the Red Alert or Strangelove problem - where a base commander took it on himself to launch his planes deliberately - was a very real problem and was in no way physically ruled out. In fact from my work as early as the summer of '58 at Rand I had become aware of the many opportunities and possibilities where even an honest misunderstanding of a situation by a lower commander might lead him to believe that it was his duty to carry out such an attack -- that the moment had arrived. (See my memo on this). This is the sort of thing that I set out to focus on in the Pacific.

52
OK:
10 minute
alert

Our CINCPAC study group visited, among other places, a USAF base at Kadena, Okinawa, where a dozen or so F-100's were on ten-minute strip alert. The pilots were allowed to leave the strip for errands, while they were on alert duty, because they were each accompanied by a jeep and driver and an alert drill was practiced at least once a day. In fact, to demonstrate their capability the officer in charge offered to let us pick the time to call an alert during our visit, which we did. Klaxons went off everywhere within hearing, jeeps began converging on the strip within minutes and pilots were scrambling into their planes while we watched the clock. Amazingly enough, the engines were gunning and the planes were ready to takeoff in less than ten minutes: a stunning performance.

They did not, however, either taxi to the end of the runway or actually take off in such alerts--as SAC planes frequently did, or as certain other types of tactical fighter bombers did--because, it was explained to us, the 1.1 megaton thermonuclear bombs (each one more than 50 times the explosive power of the Nagasaki weapon) that hung underneath the planes were somewhat obsolescent weapons. They were not "sealed pit" weapons, they were basically designed to be carried inside a plane, not slung underneath, and they were "not 3-point-safe." A 3-point-safe, which was characteristic of the newer weapons, meant that if three sections of the high explosives that surrounded the ~~fix~~ion core--which in turn was to set off the thermonuclear material--went off accidentally, the result should not be

important
PE

F-100's
not 3pt
Safe =
1.1 H Bomb
1959

nuclear explosion, but if more than three went off it might explode, have a partial explosion or a total explosion. That meant, in other words, that if ~~it~~ ^{these older weapons} were dropped, ^{that one or burned,} or two sections of the high explosive going off might result in a partial or total ^{nuclear} explosion; and this risk, while small, was not worth taking in an alert, which after all happened once a day, a full-scale alert which involved pilots actually jumping into planes and running up their motors. But they did not go to the point of going down the runway, because of the danger of an accident in which one might go off.

I had been concerned at Rand with the false alarm problem. This led in my mind immediately to the question, supposing ^e some day there was not an alert but a false alarm sufficient to cause these planes to execute their emergency plan, short of an execute order. This called for these planes actually to take off and to circle in rendezvous areas until they received an execute order. If they did not receive it, they were eventually to return to base: ^{this was the "fail-safe" concept.} The takeoff was simply for their physical protection lest they be caught above ground by a nuclear attack. This might result either from an alerting order from Washington, or more likely from some theater command, concerning danger of some sort, and of course it would result ~~probably~~ if a nuclear weapon went off anywhere in

the theater. There would be sufficient expectation that a nuclear attack was underway as to cause most commanders to tell their subordinate commanders to execute at least protective launch. In theory again, remember, there was to be no "execute" unless they received a positive order to go ahead. This is the essence of what is known as the fail-safe procedure. No plan allowed them, without an execute order, to decide for themselves to go ahead and execute. Only if they received an authenticated message that had certain passwords - characteristics that indicated that it came directly from the President - ~~was it~~ ^{were they} to go towards target.

The problem that I discovered was that this was a process that could be set in motion, ^{for} ~~be~~ one thing, by a nuclear blast anywhere in the area; but there was the additional problem that once a blast went off anywhere in the area there were several other effects on expectation. For one, ^{knowledge of} ~~that~~ very fact would almost certainly convince most people that a nuclear attack was underway, subjectively, whether or not they had received an execute order. Second, if they were launched for any reason at all - such as a blast in some other theater, like the European theater, or intelligence warning - a subsequent blast then had a distinctly higher likelihood than earlier, by the very fact that these planes were now taxiing and taking off. It was in recognition of that danger that

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they were forbidden to take off under normal alerting or practice procedures. So that meant that if you had a blast anywhere in the world or had other reason to expect an attack, a nuclear weapon had some significant likelihood of going off accidentally in the next few minutes somewhere in the world on an alert strip.

A third result was that that fast-alert blast in itself would almost certainly disrupt all communications within the area. Certainly it would destroy all transmitting points in the vicinity of the base, but moreover, the electronic affects of the blast itself would probably disrupt all high frequency communications in that area. That meant that the last message that any other bases in the area would receive, for a period, would be that a blast had just occurred and they would then find themselves out of communications locally; just after, perhaps, a message putting them on an extraordinary state of alert, requiring them for the first time actually to take off. Fourth, the very fact that they had gotten to the point of actually launching would be a first for any of those pilots and would itself subjectively make them almost certain that an attack was underway.

All of this added up to the likelihood that a high level false alarm anywhere in the world was considerably likely to generate the belief in the minds of some airborne pilots armed with megaton weapons that, although they had not received an execute order, general nuclear war had already

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started, and that they had no ability to receive an execute order because communications had been disrupted by the war.

My knowledge of military interpretation of orders and military dedication, from my own experience in the Marines and, by now, a couple of years of experience with Staff officers, convinced me that in that situation they would regard their duty as being to carry out their mission, their general war mission, in violation of the strict letter of their orders to await a positive authorization, which would be unlikely to be forthcoming, they would ~~find~~ ^{realize} ~~realize~~ if war were underway.

I discussed this with a number of Staff officers at various levels and finally felt that I needed a degree of corroboration at the lowest level of command, so I took a special trip, on very short notice, to Korea to talk to the officer in charge of the northernmost set of alert planes in Korea at Kunsan. I landed in Seoul and got myself a light plane ride up to Kunsan. I found myself at a small strip in South Korea which had planes within a few minutes flying time of targets in Russia. They were the closest to targets, which could mean they would have the first bombs to fall in actual war. Remember, this was the era '59 and '60. We were still dependent almost entirely on bombs rather than missiles. We had a few short-range missiles and a few intermediate range rockets, but ~~no few~~ ICBM's.

This field was like a little western town with a

dusty air-strip. I found a major there in charge of a dozen planes or so. At one point I began asking some questions and he got very edgy and refused to answer. He said that he would have to see my authorization. After he did this a couple of times I got mad and said, well we will just have to call Japan and let you talk to somebody. He tried to call Japan and made the interesting discovery that there was no communications with Japan and there had not been any for a couple of hours. I asked him how often this happened and he said ^{that} "about once a day," atmospheric troubles of different kinds put out his communications with Japan.

Of course, he usually had communications with the main headquarters in Korea ^{at} ~~and~~ Osan, which had the same kind of alert operation. But it was clear to me from the thinking I had been doing in Okinawa, that if for example, an explosion took place at Osan for the reasons that I have described, he would now quite likely be out of communications with the rest of the world; except for the knowledge, probably last minute knowledge, that a nuclear weapon had exploded at some other base.

After we finally got the word from Japan that he could tell me anything, I reiterated the question that had led to this delay, and he admitted that he did not know the answer to that particular one. Ultimately though, he did get quite communicative, and I asked him under what conditions he would send his planes on alert in the air. He said, " Well, you

know when I'm supposed to do it, don't you?" I said, "Yes, when you get an order via Japan from the President." He said, "That's right. But, let me tell you, I'm the commander of this base and every commander has an inherent right to protect his forces. That is a fundamental law of war," he said, "as a military commander I have the right to protect my forces and if I believed that they were endangered by anything, I would send them off."

I asked, "What would they do?" He said, "Well, they would go to an area [which he showed me on the map] and they would circle in that area, although they could do so, not having much fuel, for only an hour or so before they would have to either come back or go on to their targets." I asked him the conditions under which he would do that, and he agreed that certainly a nuclear weapon at Osan would be more than sufficient, but I also put to him an outage of communication during an intense crisis. He agreed that might lead him to do that without orders, as was true with many other levels of command.

I discovered, I might say, that throughout the world commanders believed that an outage of communication during an intense crisis would be regarded as a very ominous sign, requiring at the least a high level of alert, including, perhaps, a launch of some planes, even though, at that time in every area, outage of communication from natural

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disturbances was a fairly frequent phenomenon. Although I don't remember the exact circumstances, during an earlier crisis all communications with our BMEWs, Ballistic Missiles Early Warning System in Canada and Alaska went out at one point, because a forest fire had destroyed one set of land-lines and, I believe, a slight earthquake had destroyed the others. Communications between Europe and America were frequently disrupted in high frequency communication, and all the more in the Pacific. So to discover, by interviewing these commanders, that they regarded outage of communication as potentially a very ominous sign, naturally, indicating that the higher level of command might have been destroyed, especially if it occurred in combination with other signs, told one immediately they might take their alerting measures. The next question was what the effect of taking those alerting measures would be.

In this case, in Kunsan, I asked the Major what he thought would happen if these planes were ordered to take off. To begin with, if it were a false alarm, there would be no coordinating plane for the area ~~up there~~ to give them further instructions and to monitor their operations, so the ten planes would be circling up there by themselves. There would be a coordinating plane sent up there only if there were a theatre-wide alert; but if he, himself, sent them up, the plane, which came from a different base, would not be up there. Second, they would be out of communications

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Why?

with him, at his base.

What then would happen when they failed to get an execute order within the next hour? I think, in fact, as my notes show it, he asked himself that rhetorical question, since I had been asking him similar questions. What would happen if they didn't get their Execute Order? He paused for a moment and then said, reflectively, "I think they'd come back. I think most of them would come back."

I will always remember, at that moment, a voice inside my head crying out, "Think?!" This was the man who was entirely in charge of the training, disciplining and control of these planes, and he was telling me, who had been sent from CINCPAC headquarters, that he thought that most of them would carry out their orders to return if they did not get an execute order. He then went on to say, "Of course if one of them were to break out of that circle and go for his target, I think the rest would follow." "And they might as well," he added, "since, of course, if one was going to go, they might as well all go." He was quite philosophical about this possibility, although as he said, "I tell them not to do it."

I asked him what would happen if they saw a nuclear weapon explode behind them. This was a possibility in every one of these bases, where having taken off on an un-

precedented alert for whatever reason, there was a significant possibility that the nine men, say, who took off first would look back and discover a mushroom cloud as the tenth one exploded on the base. Everyone agreed that this was a real possibility. When I asked him what he thought the reaction of the pilots would be, I remember the major at Kunsan made the comparison, "Well, of course it's not like Okinawa where that would mean to the pilots that their families had just been destroyed."

In Korea they didn't have their families. The implication of what he was saying was that the likelihood that pilots would go on to disobey regulations by going to target would be influenced, he thought, by the fact that in the case of such an explosion, whether it was an accident or not, the men at Okinawa would be aware that their families had just been killed. The event might turn on that. In Korea they were expected to be more detached, as all they would have lost was the major.

So I came back with tales like this to tell to higher commanders within the Pacific, and I briefed them on various things. Another was the precise way in which an Execute Order could be sent out by a duty colonel in CINCPAC or USARPAC headquarters or at lower levels, causing all lower levels to execute their war plans. I had discovered, for one thing, that it was very common for one alert officer in the middle of the night to be alone in a particular

Exec.
order
officer
dual
control
weak

command post with access to the execute orders. They had rules that there must be two officers there at all times, but I discovered that these rules were frequently violated, and could easily be circumvented by an officer who wanted to carry these out. I revealed this kind of thing at high levels in the Pacific, in fact, I think, to all of the component commanders in the Pacific, at some length and with their great interest. This whole experience interested me all the more in a device that I had earlier discussed with Jack Carne at Rand in the summer of '58, which was an actual physical lock that would make it impossible for a nuclear weapon to be fired, without higher authorization. It would have the character of a combination lock, and thus could be opened only if an authentication in the form of a combination came from a higher authority, ideally from the President himself. This idea, so far as I know, *may have* originated with us in the summer of '58 and ultimately led to the Permissive Action Link, instituted by McNamara in '61 and '62, which consisted of various increasingly more sophisticated locks on nuclear weapons. *led PML*

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Ultimately, in order to understand the theory of the plan, the strategy and the way it was likely to be implemented, I read the entire structure of plans relating to nuclear war for the Pacific. This meant, to give you an idea of this, starting with the GEOP (General Emergency Operations Plan) which was up-dated yearly and was the CINCPAC Plan. Below this were the component plans of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the USAPPAC, CINCPAC Fleet and PACAF. Below them, for example, in the Air Force case, a Seventh Air Force Plan, ^{then} this going down to Air Division, then finally plans relating to an individual squadron. In the Navy case we go down to the CINCPAC Fleet, down to the 7th Fleet and ultimately to carrier division and individual carriers and pilots. In the Army there were also what were called subordinate unified commands, in which a particular commander would command the fleet services in a particular area. There was the Taiwan Defense Command.

File "Line -
Soviet Bloc

GEOP.

DE
US APPAC ?

and the Korean Command which also had the U.N. Command, called CINCUNC or COMUSK (Commander of U.S. Forces, Korea). and in the Army case you would be going down ultimately to the plan for divisions and battalions. So I would have read in many cases, following a particular service line down, seven or eight levels of plans with increasing specificity and decreasing geographical coverage in terms of targets and units involved.

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All of these would use overlapping language. They would start with a statement of objectives and of the concept of the plan, strategy, and the task involved. The language of course would pretty much be unified; it was intended to be uniform from top to bottom. But both because of secrecy and by bureaucratic division of labor, there was no process of review of these plans that involved looking at the entire structure of plans; or in fact, looking at anything but the next lower level of plans, which was based on one's own unit's plan and, of course, the next higher level of plan on which the planner based his own plan. So typically a person would be aware of three levels of the plan, but not more.

I discovered by questioning people experienced in the process - and many of these planners had worked in Washington in the JCS - that there was no agency throughout that did a review of more than these two or three levels, or at the most, four levels. The effect.

of this, I discovered, were astounding discrepancies if one compared levels even three or four levels apart.

Changes that would appear subtle from one plan to the next, from one level to the next, in the wording of objectives or in the assignment of tasks would be magnified as they went down several levels. So if you compared, let's say, four levels apart, the task that a carrier division or even the Seventh Fleet might find itself assigned by its planners and commander to carry out would be markedly different from the task envisioned for that area and situation at the level of CINCPAC or the JCS.

There was no reason to believe that the higher level commanders were aware of these discrepancies. As a matter of fact, people at the lower level were not aware in many cases that there were these enormous discrepancies, because no one ever had access in general. Except for that one cage in the Pacific there was probably no other place in the Pacific that collected all of these plans in one place and had the for higher level plans with which to compare one's own plans. You could only compare with your next higher level, which of course you were always interpreting to meet your own circumstances to some degree.

One aspect of this, a gross aspect, was that Pacific Forces from top to bottom were focused on a conflict with China, since with the range limitations of their weapons

Q and the geography of the Sino-Soviet Bloc almost no Russian target lay within their range except for a few in the Vladivostok and Siberian area. Once you destroyed Vladivostok, war with Russia was no longer "interesting" to the CINCPAC Forces, whereas China, although offering few really "lucrative" industrial targets, loomed as a large land mass suitable for attack and largely within reach, with the additional feature that the population was heavily concentrated in the seaboard area close to the Seventh Fleet carriers. In contrast to China, CINCPAC planners were unable to get really interested in the question of fighting Russia, although of course this was the almost exclusive preoccupation in the late '50's of Washington, and in the European area.

CA/Sov =
twisted

When I later became aware of the provisions JCS Joint Strategic Capability Plan which governed all of the theater plans, I found that, in principle, provision was made for conflicts that involved only Russia. But I had by then discovered that no such provision was made either in plan or in practice in any area of Pacific operations. This omission was reflected in writing, it was reflected in the way training was conducted and weapons were allocated, but also in the attitude of all of the commanders and officers involved. When the very question was raised of the possibility of fighting Russia "rather than" China, they would express only bafflement, horror, almost physical

nausea at the thought; and they would express this in such terms as: "I just cannot conceive of their doing such an unbelievably stupid thing as to take on the Russians and not also the Chinese."

Very simply, there were neither plans nor capability in the short run, I discovered, to attack only Russian targets and not Chinese targets. By that I mean that on a runway in Guam or Okinawa or Korea, planes would be targeted in a fashion on the alert runway - ready to take off on ten minutes alert - such that one plane with a 1.1 megaton bomb slung under it would be targeted for the Vladivostok area and a plane next to it on the runway, which would be taking off at a few seconds interval, would be targeted and trained and briefed and practiced for a target in China. In other words, planes within a ten-man alert section on a given runway would be scrambled in terms of their national targets. And because this targeting was handled by the crew on computer readouts which did not identify whether the target would hit China or Russia, but merely gave coordinates, there was no way, either manually or in simple terms of computer programs, to unscramble the targets and assure that, say, only planes 7, 6 and 11, which were targeted for Russia, should take off out of that alert force.

It had never occurred to anyone that I ever met in the Pacific that such an order might come down, and not only had no provision ever been made for it, but the provisions made

for general nuclear war were such that there was no physical way in which to bring about an attack only on Russian targets or only on Chinese targets.

Omitting Russia was, in a way a little easier because so many targets were listed for China that some entire airfields would be targeted only on China or couldn't reach Russia. The fields in the South Pacific had no Russian targets because they couldn't reach Russia. As I discussed this with planners I discovered, in practical terms, that if you seriously wanted only to attack China, for example, you could simply cut out an entire airfield in some cases and thus, you would lose some Chinese targets but you would cut out all the Russian targets that were out of range of other fields. But if you wanted to hit only Russia there was almost no airfield that was targeted only on Russian targets. You could cut out the CINCPAC forces entirely. Of course, you would do that only if it occurred to you that this might be a problem. I never found anyone in Washington who had any idea that there was this kind of problem. To show the kind of physical ways this showed up, in many targeting maps in operations and plan centers and command posts in the Pacific - I am talking about airfields and command posts in Okinawa, Formosa, Guam, Tokyo, and I was on board several carriers and command ships in the Pacific - in each one of these places you would have a map showing nuclear war targets. It would be their most secret map, usually

covered by a screen or a curtain drawn over it when other people were being briefed in the room who did not have access to these nuclear targets. On those maps, typically, the map did not show the boundary between China and Russia. So you could not tell simply by inspecting the arrows on the map, the pins on the map that indicated targets of different category, whether they were in China or Russia. In some maps, for example, I would find a piece of colored string put on for convenience, for aesthetic reasons perhaps, indicating roughly the boundary of Russia and China. But that meant that a high level planner in that division could not, just by inspecting those targets, decide which ones to pull.

The next question would be, could he determine from the target quickly what tail number - which was the way they designated airplanes - was assigned to that particular target? The answer was that it was an extremely laborious process. It was not something you do in minutes or hours. It would probably be a matter of days or weeks to sort out what planes were assigned to what target; and that meant that if this was anything like an emergency or surprise attack situation, where we were being attacked, it was simply physically impossible to do that kind of work.

But that was only one part of it. The other part was the question--Given the attitude and preconceptions in the minds of operators and alert officers, how were

they likely to interpret various orders that came down? Let me give you one aspect of this. For reasons that I will go into later, "general war" was defined in the Joint Chiefs capabilities plan as war with Russia. General war alerting orders thus tended to have simply the character: "execute general war plans." If general war should be decided on as a result of a conflict with Russia, quite possibly arising out of the Berlin Corridor as in '61, it would have led to general war execute orders which were prewritten and prepositioned. For both speed and security the text of these orders, omitting date and time of execution, would be prepositioned with the lowest levels of command all over the world. Thus the actual execute order could be sent in the clear, without being coded, for greater speed and reliability, and would simply take the form: "Execute Order No. XYZ," giving a date and time of execution. The person receiving that would look up the plan referred to in a "library" - actually, usually, a looseleaf folder of prepositioned messages - and would fill in the date and time. Moreover, the execute orders themselves, in the Pentagon, were prewritten, except for some last minute details so that an officer in the Joint Staff would fill in certain blanks, literally blanks in the message, before he sent that out.

Thus you could predict very closely how a given decision at the top would be reflected in the wording of

messages that would go down to subordinate layers of command, because in each layer these messages, for speed and reliability and for ability to transmit in the clear, were prepositioned. As soon as the few blanks were filled in, you knew the exact wording of the whole message. You could make, then, not guesses but judgments near certainty as to how those messages would be acted on, if you knew the preconceptions or the understanding of these officers below and the plans and preparations they had made for carrying them out.

There was no blank in the execute orders going out from Washington, at that time, specifying countries to be hit under conditions of general war. Yet as I have said, the general war planners - and I spoke to the very highest levels of planners in Washington - had no awareness of the general war plans distributed throughout the Pacific which said, in effect, "In the event of general war, you will expend most of your weapons on China plus whatever can reach Russian target on the few Russian targets within range." This was reiterated at every level. Even if there had been understanding of the intent in one level of the order from Washington - to hit Russia, say, but not China - and some attempt to correct for this, one could show that it would almost surely be aborted by the execute orders and responses at lower levels. Moreover, if it was decided

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not to hit China one would have a choice either of hitting nothing at all or hitting both Russia and China nevertheless. And in general war discrimination is not to be expected; aside from the fact that it was the attitude of all of these officers, without exception, that an order by their superior to hit only Russia amounted to insanity. They were literally shocked by the suggestion.

The upshot of all this was that one could make an extremely strong case that the result of an order by the President or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to hit only military targets in Russia - and the people in Washington were able to conceive of such a situation, there was even some provision for it - with near certainty a result of that order would be the destruction of all cities in China. And this without anyone in the level of command believing that he was doing anything against his orders, or certainly, against the interests of the United States. This would involve, in Russia and China together, the deaths of 370,000,000 people.

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Nuclear Weapons in Japan

Starting in the fall of 1959 with my study of the command facilities and the nuclear weapons plans and operations in the Pacific, and going into 1960 and 1961 with my work in Washington with the air staff war planners, which took me to SAC Headquarters a couple of times, I came to know as much as any American, not only civilian but military, about the system of targeting and controlling vehicles for general nuclear war, and also the actual targets and structure of the plans.

I had spent the summer of '58 working conceptually on the strategic parts of the plan - including such missile forces as we had and the control of SAC B-52s - at Rand, in company with Wohlstetter, Rowen, Kahn, Marshall, et al.

In the Pacific, what I was learning was the role that was played by theater vehicles, which were scarcely taken into account at all in the thinking of SAC war planners. Rand's studies dealt almost entirely with SAC operations, which had to do with the B-52 force, at that time the heart of our retaliatory force, and the B-52 bases in the U.S., plus a handful of intermediate range missiles, Thors in England and Jupiters in Turkey. SAC paid little attention to vehicles which were not under their immediate operational control. In the theaters, however, both in the Pacific and in Europe, the theater commanders tended to think of their weapons as very important. The size of their weapons was very much smaller,

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and in particular the reliability of their forces was very much less, because they consisted of airplanes on extremely vulnerable airfields, so that in the event of attack the likelihood of their survival would have been relatively small. Also, the range of these vehicles was relatively short, so they were targeted on peripheral targets on what we still called the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and on targets that SAC regarded as much less important than the industrial targets and air bases which were in the heartland of Russia.

At one point during my work in the Pacific I became aware of the fact ^{that} ~~of the~~ number of bases in Japan which were targeted to deliver weapons in the event of general nuclear war, or execution of the CINCPAC-GEOP. Japan had as the central provision of its security arrangements with the United States the explicit agreement in writing that no nuclear weapons would ever be stationed in Japan. There was actually an exception to this which was undoubtedly known, at least tacitly, to some of the high officials in Japan, that American carriers that had R-and-R or occasional stops in the ports of Japan would in fact have nuclear weapons aboard. But there was a policy of the Department of Defense, up until very recently, that we would not acknowledge the presence of nuclear weapons on any particular warship, or for that matter, base, anywhere in the world. One major purpose of that was to avoid having to admit that there were nuclear weapons on such carriers. In fact, I believe that

there had been occasions when we had denied that there were such nuclear weapons. But by something of a tacit agreement, even the left in Japan had not made a major political issue out of this, although they could have done so at any time. And a subject of a good deal of discussion in the Department of Defense was the prospect that eventually we might want Polaris submarines to come into Japanese ports. The possibility that they could suffer a collision with some other ship meant they could conceivably release radioactive material or suffer what was known as an HE explosion of the high explosive shell around the nuclear core, or even a partial or full explosion of a missile. These results either of collision or an accident aboard the ship were a small but real possibility, and we could anticipate that there would be a great deal of reaction against this because of what the U.S. Government regarded as the somewhat neurotic obsession of the Japanese with the problem of nuclear explosions. This had already been discussed in connection with our carriers. A third prominent and already controversial problem was our nuclear submarines, other than Polaris, which themselves offered the possibility of the release of radio-active materials in connection with accidents, as has occasionally happened. We were well aware that all three of these offered potential for major diplomatic problems.

However, we did not violate the agreement to the extent

of actually basing weapons in any of our U.S. Air Force bases in Japan, which did have a very sizeable number of nuclear weapons targets assigned to them in the Vladivostok area and, of course, in China. Earlier issues had arisen over using Japanese bases during the Korean war, for transit, and later there was to be considerable controversy, over the use of Japan as a staging area for airplanes on the way to Vietnam. In fact, a great controversy even arose over the considerable use made of Okinawa for that purpose, and the return of the island to Japan, to prevent such operations. Everyone was very conscious of this as a live issue, so people were unusually conscious of the provisions of our security treaty with Japan which forbade the use of bases for nuclear weapons. We visited every major Air Force base in Japan while I was there and there was much awareness of all this.

The plans actually called, in the event of certain emergencies, for the use of Japanese bases despite this agreement, although in principle we were to get the approval of the Japanese premier before we used them. But the plans called for the transfer of nuclear weapons from Okinawa, and other places like Guam, to Japan. That process which would take a number of hours - I can't remember exactly - but at least six or eight hours, and the reason that it was that fast was that as part of the alert plan operation KC-97 tankers on Okinawa had nuclear weapons aboard and they were on alert. In a general war alert - which, as we discussed

earlier, could have been a false alarm - these planes would take off for Japan. In principle they could be called back if it turned out to be a false alarm. Unlike other planes which could be launched on alert, it was not arranged that they should circle around waiting for an execute; since they were merely delivering weapons without actually dropping them, the plan was that they would go directly to the Air Force bases in Japan and deliver their bombs. This allowed, then, for the possibility or risk that in a false alarm, bombs would be landed in Japan, conceivably without having obtained the approval of the Japanese premier and thus in violation of our treaty. On the other hand, since this would be at U.S. bases it would not follow that the Japanese would actually know that this had happened. It was regarded as an acceptable risk to plan on that basis. Anyway, it was assumed that under conditions of that urgency we were willing to take a risk of violating the treaty.

The very complexity of these plans, of course, was a tribute to the fact that the treaty provision was taken with considerable seriousness. It was understood by everybody that a violation of that provision was likely to lead to an abrogation of the security treaty, and probably to the fall of any pro-U.S. government in Japan and its replacement by a government that would entirely change its relationship with the U.S. and with China. And among other things it would lead to the loss of U.S. bases both in Japan and in Okinawa.

Nearly all of the planes to receive these nuclear weapons

were Air Force planes. They were not on quick alert, inasmuch as it would take 6-12 hours for their weapons to arrive. And the plans were not absurd, in that it was more likely than not that a general war situation would be preceded by a period of at least hours or days of considerable warning; unless it were a surprise attack out of the blue, which was the least likely situation, and in which SAC would be the principle retaliatory force in any case. The forces as a whole in the Pacific were regarded simply as supplementing the forces of SAC, and supplementing with such low reliability, slowness, and small weapons, from the point of view of SAC, that SAC did not bother to include them in their plans. That is, in establishing a target list that SAC thought of as critical targets, in purchasing SAC planes to cover those targets, in training them and supplying them and everything else, SAC covered all targets with its own weapons and did not allocate any of these targets to theater forces. So theater forces simply covered supplemental targets, or else added additional weapons onto targets that were already covered by SAC. The redundancy of this process, incidently, was such that many of the targets regarded as important would have 17, 20 or 25 different vehicles assigned to them, any one of which would have destroyed the target and its surrounding area. And a target like Moscow probably had well over 100.

duplicate
everything

I mention all this to put into perspective the fact

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the one small base in Japan, namely Iwakuni, which was a Marine air base, had a handful of planes on it with general war missions, whose mission could not have been more marginal to the overall war plans. It involved only a few Marine planes, whose mission and training, of course, was primarily for limited war missions as in Korea, and whose main training was with high explosive. But they did have, nevertheless, a secondary general war role, and even an alert status in some cases. I discovered at some point in my Pacific travels - whether originally on the 7th Fleet command ship or in Japan, I don't remember, but I corroborated it later in talking to the chief of war plans at CINCPAC headquarters - that because this was a Marine base and because of the special relation of the Marines with the Navy, the Navy had an arrangement whereby an LST (Landing Ship, Tank) was stationed just offshore of Iwakuni with nuclear weapons aboard, to provide these bombs for the handful of planes at Iwakuni. This LST was permanently stationed in the territorial waters of Japan. It had the cover mission of being an electronic repair ship. In line with this cover, it was not just in the 3-mile limit, it was actually anchored 100 or 200 yards offshore. It was virtually on the beach at Iwakuni. By any standards it was stationed on the territory of Japan.

The principle of its operation was that in any kind of emergency, it would come straight ashore, beaching as it is designed to do. The front of the ship would open up and

the bombs would come out on amphibious tractors, going straight to the airfield where they would be loaded upon Marine planes. Thus, this handful of Marine planes would have their weapons some 6 to 10 hours before the hundreds of planes assigned to the Air Force in Japan. Presumably they would not take off in advance of those planes. And whether they did or not, their contribution to the general war plan was of an absolutely negligible sort; it was not taken into account even by the local U.S. theater planning in Japan by the Air Force or Navy carrier forces, let alone by our major SAC retaliatory forces.

The landing of the tractors and bombs was a maneuver that the LST apparently practices occasionally, as rehearsal; and the existence of these bombs was apparently fairly well known at the base, although it was not generally well known either by the Air Force or, of course, by the Japanese. It was regarded as a super-secret from the Japanese, needless to say.

By the time I learned of this, I was as well informed as anyone, probably, in the country to make an assessment of the potential advantage of allowing those planes to have weapons a few hours earlier than the other planes in the country. There could be no question, thinking of every conceivable contingency, that there was no advantage whatever, under any conceivable circumstances, for that to happen. Every planner to whom I spoke, at 7th Fleet and

at CINCPAC, shared that opinion. The risk that was being run was that if the Japanese government should become aware of this, and particularly if the opposition to the Japanese government should become aware of it, there would be a total rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, very possibly a shift toward the Chinese, who at that time were regarded as still part of the Soviet Bloc.

How could this have become known to the Japanese? Well, people told me that the situation was fairly well known not only by the pilots who practised this maneuver occasionally, and by the LST ship crewmen who were there permanently, but, needless to say, to some fraction of their girlfriends in Japan and probably of the people in the region. (As a footnote to this sort of thing, one day I was looking for the concealed, camouflaged underground, CINCPAC command-post, whose location was "secret" in Hawaii; it was located, indeed, under an absolutely normal-looking pineapple field criss-crossed by dirt roads. I became lost and stopped at a gas station with some Chinese-Americans running it to ask them for the location of Fields Corner, or some name like that, which was a map location that identified the area of this entrance to the underground command post. And the man seemed very puzzled by what I was asking for, until finally he said, "Oh, you mean the underground," and gave

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me the exact directions for reaching it. This sort of thing is absolutely normal.) It could almost be taken for granted that some Japanese in that area did know about this.

I was also aware, from the study at Rand of the possibilities of sabotage, that there would be no trick whatever for frogmen, whether Japanese or others, going out to that ship, planting lim^e mines to the side of the ship and causing an explosion on the ship, which would at the least raise public questions about the nature of the ship and the incident, or conceivably cause a high explosive or a partial or total nuclear explosion on board the ship, if they were lucky. (In fact, the mine could be nuclear itself). So there was literally the possibility ^{of} for a nuclear explosion taking place in Iwakuni, followed by an investigation that would discover that we had stationed a few weapons here. There would be no way ever of telling that that explosion had been caused by outsiders as opposed to an accidental explosion by American weapons that were placed aboard that ship. (The actual cause of the explosion of the Maine remains uncertain to this day!)

The stationing of these weapons, for such a reason, was the most fantastically irresponsible action it was possible to imagine: short of, perhaps, storing, unnecessarily, some accident-prone weapons in Washington, D.C. Yet the secrecy system in the atomic weapons area

kept this known, among Americans outside Iwakuni, only to a small circle of nuclear weapons planners. In fact, the fact that I knew it at that point stamped me as someone who knew just about anything, which itself was an open door to any further secrets. When I got back in the country, I was extremely concerned about this situation but didn't know what to do with the information. I told the highest officials at Rand about it to see what they could do. They in turn told an Air Force Plans officer, a general; I was told, through a Vice President of Rand, Goldstein, ^{that} the Air Force officers agreed that this was an extremely serious situation, but they did not know what to do about it since it was, after all, controlled by the Navy. ~~and that~~ It would be an extremely delicate matter for the Air Force to raise questions about where the Navy was storing its nuclear weapons, since on matters like that, there tended to be alliances between the Navy and the Air Force. In fact, for a long time there had been an alliance between the Navy and the Air Force on the subject of reliance on nuclear weapons, as opposed to the Army, which was disadvantaged in the budget battle by this sort of alliance. So it wasn't advantageous for the Air Force to make waves for the Navy, so to speak.

This went on in 1960; I didn't know what to do further about the situation. However as soon as Paul

Nitze got in as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, who thus was in charge both of liaison with the military, on the one hand, and with diplomatic relationships on the other, I wrote a memo to Nitze ~~and~~ through Harry Rowen, his Deputy, I was asked to put it all in writing and to do the typing myself for special security. I typed out a memo and stamped it "TOP SECRET - Eyes Only for Paul Nitze," giving in detail all that I knew and how I had come to know it about the situation, naming the LST and giving an analysis based on my experience of the pros and cons: i.e. the ways in which this could be rationalized, and my conclusion that the obvious risks were counterbalanced by almost no military advantage whatever. I gave a fairly exhaustive analysis of that problem, because anyone coming into contact with such a grievous anomaly would first imagine that there must be some highly technical reason justifying it. Of course, it was evident to all people in the theater - none of whom made any strategic rationale whatever for it - that the reason was very simply that the Marines, having this intimate relation with the Navy, were able to have an LST nearby, whereas you could not keep an Air Force KC-97 flying at all times with nuclear weapons aboard in the vicinity of Japan. That was the only reason that they would have weapons sooner

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than anybody else. To belabor one point: there was only one such base involved, and this violation of the treaty affected only a handful of weapons out of the whole theater. It wasn't even as though a large number of Navy bases were influenced by this, so that it would affect a sizeable part of the forces. Yet the risk was virtually the same as if it had been a lot of bases.

Nitze had the memo "staffed out". He assigned, I believe, his assistant Timothy Stanley to investigate this, and perhaps also Larry McQuade, who was also an assistant. I was shown the TOP SECRET report that came out of this investigation. First, all of the facts that I had reported were corroborated. But also it was corroborated by the foreign relations specialists within ISA that there was no question but that this was a clear-cut violation of both letter and spirit of our security treaty. This was contrasted with such marginal cases as the carrier visits and even the possibility of our emergency alert plans being executed. This was a permanent installation and could not even be said to be "in the water, not on the territory," as it would be regarded by every legal test as being on the territory. And they corroborated the extreme diplomatic risks that this involved; the conclusion of that analysis was the same as mine, that it was of high urgency that this situation be corrected immediately.

But there was some additional information. A person reported that on first investigating the whereabouts of this LST, he went to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Weapons and Atomic Energy, who was in charge of knowing the whereabouts of every individual nuclear weapon in the world, including test devices and weapons under production and everything else. The Assistant had an enormous looseleaf notebook that had the reported whereabouts of every weapon in the world. No weapons were listed for Japan. No ship carrying weapons was listed as stationed there. And in fact there was no indication that any such situation existed. When Nitze's staff man pressed the point, the Special Assistant, who had extremely high status, by the way, and was a direct representative of the Secretary of Defense, called the appropriate agency in the Navy to check on it; he was told that there was no such situation. However, in later pursuing the name which I had supplied for the LST, Nitze's man discovered that it was listed as home-ported in Okinawa. And on following up that question, he discovered that it was being carried in Okinawa by the Navy as a cover precisely to deceive the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, while in fact it was permanently installed in Iwakuni. By a coincidence, at the very moment of this investigation, the ship was in Okinawa for repairs and overhaul, which was going to take another month or two, a situation that arose every three years

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or so. So at that moment it was not in Japan. All that had to be done, then, was to keep it in Okinawa, where it was officially home-ported.

It was quite clear to everybody, and not really denied by anybody, the reason it was carried on the books in Okinawa was to deceive the Secretary of Defense. And deception of the Secretary of Defense on the whereabouts of a nuclear weapon was recognized by everybody as the highest imaginable offense within the bureaucracy. It was not regarded as within the rules of the bureaucratic game, in the remotest sense. So the clearcut recommendation by Nitze's staff was that Nitze should take this up immediately with Secretary McNamara and see to it that the ship should remain in Okinawa. Paul Nitze drafted this recommendation, in roughly February or March of 1961; he drafted a memo for Secretary McNamara to sign, calling for the LST in question to remain in Okinawa, not to return to Japan, and to shift its operations exclusively into Okinawa. Immediately after that memo went out signed by McNamara, Paul Nitze found himself at a meeting in McNamara's office with Admiral Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, at the end of which Burke asked him to return with him to Burke's office in a different part of the Pentagon. When they arrived in the office, Burke sat down and Nitze immediately saw that on his desk was a "burn" copy (this was the predecessor of the xerox process) of my TOP SECRET Eyes Only"

memo to him, as well as a copy of the ISA investigative report. So it was clear that almost immediately, a Naval officer serving in ISA - ISA was staffed mainly with military officers - had copied the memo and delivered it to Admiral Burke. (The meaning of "Eyes Only" is that only the addressee, Nitze, is to see the document, and no copy is to be made.) Burke referred to the memo; he made no apology for having a copy of it, which surprised Nitze more than it might have later, because Nitze was new to the Pentagon. Burke was in a fury. He made no attempt to deny the facts of the memo or to justify anything. The only argument he made, in a rage, was, "What did Nitze think he was doing, as a civilian, interfering with the operations of ships of the U.S. Navy?" The fact that this ship was in violation of one of our most sensitive international treaties and was posing enormous risks, that it was carrying nuclear weapons in violation of the Secretary of Defense's regulations and in deliberate deception of the Secretary of Defense, and that the Special Assistant had been lied to, did not come up for discussion as far as Burke was concerned. Nor would he admit any discussion of these points. His position was merely that it was absolutely unacceptable that the Secretary of Defense should presume to tell the Navy where to put its ships. Nitze was apparently very shaken by this, I was told, but decided...

QUESTION Shaken in what way? Furious or....?

No, shaken by the confrontation. Burke is a large, sandy-haired man who gets into rages.

QUESTION But Burke was totally wrong.

Ah, from one point of view.

But from the point of view of the Navy, well, Nitze was not in a clearcut command position with respect to Burke, except as he could be accepted as a direct representative of the Secretary of Defense. So everything depended, then, on McNamara's backing Nitze up on this issue. Nitze went to McNamara, I understand, and informed him that he felt that this was of the highest urgency and that he had to order Burke to comply with the directives and the treaty.

But at the point that I learned of this, McNamara had decided that, with all the fights he was having with the various services, this was one he could not afford to add; and therefore he decided to back down and to withdraw his directive, in violation of the treaty. When I heard this I raised the question: "Is McNamara aware that he was lied to by the Navy?" The answer was, "Yes, that was what had made him furious in the first place and had led him to send out the directive." He was very upset about that. But as I described much earlier, in 1961 the Secretary of Defense for the first time was in general exercising his command responsibility under the 1958 Reorganization Act, and he was doing so in a great variety of ways: in questioning the services about operational matters; in making many decisions on cutting back weapons

systems, in particular the B-70 and the number of Minuteman missiles from 1400 or 1600 to a projected level of 1000. He was involved in a number of other disputes already with the services; he had to make a choice, and in this case he decided not to fight this issue, knowing of course that if he did fight there was always the chance that the Navy would leak the dispute to some Committee in Congress, in perhaps a distorted fashion, and put him in the position precisely of entering into operations by ordering around individual ships. Remember that two years later, when McNamara was in the position of telling the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Anderson, the successor to Burke, that his ships were violating the President's orders on the operation of the blockade around Cuba, Anderson had become so furious that he virtually ordered McNamara out of the Flag Plot command post. (The result was that that admiral was removed, after the crisis, as Chief of Naval Operations, and sent as ambassador to Portugal.) That was an unprecedented confrontation. But that was the kind of thing McNamara did not choose to get into in this case. So the upshot was, to my horror, that the ship which was then still in Okinawa was allowed to travel back to Japanese waters with its cargo of nuclear weapons.

The finale for me was that at the next meeting of the Air Force Advisory Board that controlled the Rand budget, there was apparently a curious session with LeMay, who by

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then was the Chief of Staff. I was called in by Vice President Goldstein who said, "This is hard to believe, but we have a charge here from LeMay - he has been told by Admiral Burke - that you have been giving the Navy orders on how to operate a destroyer squadron. Is this possible?" My first reaction was "What?" Second, that it was not possible; and third, I suddenly realized what it was that he must be referring to, and told them the whole story of that episode. Burke had asked LeMay that I should be fired from the Rand Corporation.

In the end, nobody chided me, but everybody's reaction was that this was of extreme sensitivity because of the bureaucratic implications that it raised. It was putting one Service terribly in the wrong, in part because they had lied; their sin was so enormous that to expose it at all was rather a deadly challenge, and nobody wanted to take that on. The main thing I thought of was, does the President know this situation? I raised the question in ISA, "Is it possible that McNamara, having made this decision, has told the President of the situation?" They said that that was not realistically possible, otherwise it could not persist. To say that was to say it was taken for granted that McNamara had decided to collaborate in deceiving the White House on this situation. Whether that was true or not, I don't know. But from that time on it looked like a potential great embarrassment to McNamara himself, if he had concealed that.

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So the fact was, in other words, that the secrecy system was being used - for reasons almost entirely of agency pride - to protect a totally irrational arrangement which had the most horrendous possible diplomatic implications, and it was out of the effective control of the President of the United States, let alone the Congress.

Exposing this to Congress would have immediately raised the secrecy question, even to someone on the Hill with a clearance who dealt with such matters. It would have been treated as the exposure of an extremely "sensitive" secret. And it was. Remember, what is a "sensitive secret?" It was a secret like My Lai. It is hard to say that My Lai was not a genuine secret, in the sense that exposure of it had the potential of "damage to the United States." The exposure of any egregious violation does.

In summary, we see a function of Rand here, in the ability of Rand analysts and consultants to cross bureaucratic lines, to become aware of information concealed by one agency from another, or by all agencies from higher levels of authority, who were authorized to know it but had been deliberately deceived about this information. We have the incident of information stamped and intended only for one recipient within the system, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, immediately being leaked internally; the copying of that document and delivering it to the CNO entirely

against DoD Regulations; in other words, the regulations are violated instantly and blatantly when that serves Service interests (of protecting a practice violating a U.S. treaty!) We have the deliberate and direct deception of the Secretary of Defense and his Special Assistant, and the defiance of the Secretary by a lower agency of his directive to change the situation, about which he had been deceived and about which he had been kept in ignorance by the protective secrecy system. We have also the inhibitions of everyone in the system not only to go against bureaucratic resistances but to do so in violation of secrecy regulations which would have made it difficult to go to Congress let alone to the press. Also we have the fact that what was a genuinely "sensitive" secret was so precisely because it involved a major violation of an international treaty by the United States. Indeed, if you ask what sorts of information could conform to the definition of "top secret" as potentially leading to a direct breach in diplomatic relationships, obviously it would cover to a large extent major violations of our understandings or treaties with other countries. And the capability to keep such sensitive secrets is an encouragement to violate Congressionally-ratified treaties, without any accountability to Congress or the public.

